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VEHICLES OF MEANING:
UNCONVENTIONAL SEMANTICS AND
UNBEARABLE INTERPRETATIONS
LAURENCE R. HORN*
It strikes me as uncharitable to quibble with the accomplishments of this
colloquy of linguists and lawyers, a gathering that was obviously healthy,
valuable, and mutually enlightening. Nevertheless, since quibbling is ajoint
occupational disease of linguists and lawyers, I will forge ahead with an
almost clear conscience.
I shall begin with an anti-quibble. Contrary to the shared sense of the
meeting,' I do not see any major problems for a truth-conditional theory
of meaning stemming from the points under discussion. I find truth-
conditional semantics both a stronger and weaker resource than do my
colleagues. The basic idea is (relatively) uncontroversial: To know the
meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which it would be
true. "Hardcore Montagovians" would be the first to insist that the meaning
of an individual expression within this framework must in many cases be
regarded as a function from a given context to the proposition expressed in
that context or to the argument placed within that proposition. You don't
know what is said in a randomly chosen utterance-let's take I'm two miles
from your house now-unless you know who said it, to whom, when, and
where.2
Before fixing the relevant aspects of the context (including reference,
tense, and other deitic elements), it is impossible to determine what is said
and thus whether what is said is true. Thus pragmatics (if identified with
contextual variables) must inform truth-conditional semantics. In the
revisions of Gricean pragmatics proposed by practitioners of relevance
theory,3 it is even clearer that propositional content is radically
underdetermined by linguistic meaning. It's not a question of "discarding"
truth-conditional approaches to semantics but of understanding how the
* Professor of Linguistics, Yale University.
1. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 785, 834 (1995).
2. For a particularly incisive conception of how context and propositional content interact in the
determination of sentence meaning and truth, see Robert C. Stalnaker, Assertion, 9 SYNTAX &
SEMANTICS: PRAGMATICS 315 (Peter Cole ed., 1978).
3. See, e.g., DAN SPERBER, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION (1986).
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context informs the content (i.e., what is said).
The notion of what is said can also be viewed from another direction, as
contrasted with what is meant. The contrast between the said and the
meant, and thus between the said and the implicated (i.e., the meant-but-
unsaid), dates back to the rhetoricians of the fourth century, but it was
Grice's contribution to offer an explicit characterization of both convention-
al implicature, in which a non-truth-conditional aspect of meaning
constitutes part of the lexical meaning of a given expression, and
conversational implicature, in which the meaning of what is said is enriched
or altered by applying general principles governing rational interchange.
The issue of where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics is
thus complicated on both sides: There are truth-conditionally relevant
aspects of meaning that cannot be fully represented in lexical semantics
(e.g., the reference of shifters like , you, now in a given utterance), but
there are also aspects of lexical semantics that are not truth-conditionally
relevant (e.g., the effort conveyed by I managed to solve it; the surprise
conveyed by Even Hercules couldn't lift it; and the power asymmetry or
formality conveyed by the use of vous rather than tu in French).
In brief, the death of truth-conditional approaches to meaning has been
grossly exaggerated, perhaps because of a failure to recognize the direction
such approaches can take in the light of our current understanding of the
interplay of context and content.
I now move on to try my hand at the noble pursuit of ambulance-
chasing. The question is whether the city ordinance in (1)
(1) All vehicles are prohibited from Lincoln Park.
will be construed so as to exempt ambulances and, if so, whether they are
exempted by virtue of the function of all or vehicle as 'regulatory
variables' in the interpretation of the ordinance.
A promising direction to begin the inspection of this question, it seems
to me, is to inspect the behavior of hedges4 and in particular, the ordinary
speaker's willingness to subscribe to the characterization in (2) for the
envisaged state of affairs:
(2) Technically, an ambulance is (counts as) a vehicle.
But the real issue here does not concern the clear (if technical) membership
4. See, e.g., JOHN R. TAYLOR, LINGuISTIC CATEGORIZATION: PROTOTYPEs IN LINGUIsTc THEORY
(1989); George Lakoff, Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts, 8
CHICAGO LINGUISTIC SOc'Y 183 (Paul M. Peranteau et al. eds., 1972).
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of ambulances within the category of vehicles, so much as the question of
what counts here as the true vehicle of meaning. Note in passing that it is
not just universals like all and every that force the issue; the same problem
arises if the ordinance is expressed with a negative quantifier, as in (3):
(3) No vehicles are permitted in Lincoln Part.
If we are inclined to damn the ordinance in (1) or (3) in the face of our
desire to wish godspeed to the ambulance speeding through Lincoln Park
conveying a gravely injured patient to the hospital, we are much less likely
to be equally generous to an off-duty ambulance conveying the driver and
her date to a tryst behind the shrubbery. It is not the feature [-+ambulance]
that is relevant here, but whether the potential violation is excused by an
implicit qualifier to (1), viz.
(4) All unauthorized vehicles are prohibited from Lincoln Park.
with the understanding that the context (of law or of common sense) will
determine how the implicit material is to be interpreted. Crucially, whether
or not an exemption obtains is not a fact about an ambulance qua
ambulance, nor is it a fact about the range of the universal quantifier.
Rather it hinges on the reasons and circumstances under which the implicit
qualification is triggered and the ordinance is overridden.
Similar issues thus arise for other marginal case: Is (1) violated by a
police car in hot pursuit of a jogger? Is it violated by a parent who walks
a child's kiddie car through the park from one end to the other?
Moving from the ridiculous to the sublime, analogous questions arise in
the interpretation of an even more discussed ordinance:
(5) "Thou shalt not kill."5
Does the sixth commandment really entail that the addressee (presumably
every potential adherent of the Judeo-Christian tradition) must avoid any
circumstance in which he or she causes somebody or something to come
to be no longer alive? Even if that something is a mosquito? Does it apply
to killing prompted by self-defense or in wartime? Or is only murder ruled
out? If we look at the Framer's intention, against the background of the
Pentateuch or the Old Testament in general, many exceptions are evidently
warranted! Not that this would help, since then we are back to implicit
qualification: Thou shalt not kill unless thou art permitted to do so.
We cannot expect any of these questions to receive easy answers, any
5. Exodus 20:13.
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more than we can settle the status of manifestoes like those in (6) or (7) if
we check our politics at the door.
(6) Abortion is murder.
(7) Capital punishment is murder.
This may be partly a matter of semantics, but it is not "only semantics." It
certainly involves pragmatics as well, if we can agree that rescue ambulanc-
es are exempt from the ordinance in (1) and the squashing of a killer bee
from that in (5). We may well invoke the legal rule "Don't make nonsense
out of your statute, ' 6 but we should also recognize an application of the
philosophers' informal Principle of Charity and its recent formalizations,
from Grice's Cooperative Principle7 and his exploitation-driven mechanism
for conversational implicature to the Stalnaker-Lewis doctrine of accommo-
dation.'
Lawyers and linguists share an interest in the role of pragmatics--charity
or accommodation-in overriding the otherwise reasonable (semantic) edict
that words are not to be given a meaning they will not bear. In the
appropriate circumstances, our standards of just what meanings are
unbearable tend to be relaxed; my own interest here tends to gravitate to
the interpretation of runaway multiple negations. Jerry Sadock brings up a
case that hinged on the presence of "one too many negatives" (a striking
syntactic construction in its own right, and I have one too).9
I wrote a paper a few years ago' ° in which I explored the grounds
motivating the use of "logical double negations," i.e., multiple negatives
like the not unX construction in which the two negatives tend to cancel or
annul rather than reinforcing each other (as in the negative concord
phenomenon familiar from Romance languages or non-standard English).
Along the way, I noted that corresponding to the ancient dictum governing
these double negations, Duplex negatio affirmat, we might adopt a lemma
to the effect that Triplex negatio confundit. Given the well-documented
processing difficulty attendant to negative expressions, speakers simply lose
6. See Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 1, at 907 (comments of Michael Moore).
7. H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, 3 SYNTAX & SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 45 (Peter Cole
& Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
8. See Robert Stalnaker, Pragmatic Presuppositions, in SEMANTICS & PHILOSOPHY 197-214
(Milton K. Munitz & Peter K. Unger eds., 1974); David K. Lewis, Scorekeeping in a Language Game,
8 J. PHIL. LOGIC 339 (1979).
9. See Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 1, at 936-37 (comments of Jerry Sadock).
10. Laurence R. Horn, Duplex Negatio Affirmat ...: The Economy of Double Negation, 27
CHICAGO LINGUISTIC SoC'Y 80 (Lise M. Dobrin et al. eds., 1991).
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track of how many negatives they are juggling in a given statement, as in
the frequently encountered warning, "Don't be surprised if it doesn't rain."
Perpetrators range from J. Austen and C. Dickens to K. Rogers: "There's
nothing I don't ever wish I didn't say," Reggie Miller said "If it comes out
of my mouth, it was meant to be said."'"
No detail was too small to overlook.2
Nothing is too small or too mean to be disregarded by our scientific
economy.' 3
No one is too poor not to own an automobile. 4
I can't remember when you weren't there,
When I didn't care
For anyone but you...
1 have but one comfort in thinking of the poor, and that is, that we get
somehow adjusted to the condition in which we grow up, and we do not miss
the absence of what we have never enjoyed.' 6
I would not be surprised if his doctoral dissertation committee is not
composed of members from several departments within a university."
It never occurred to me to doubt that your work ... would not advance our
common object in the highest degree."
There was no character created by him into which life and reality were not
thrown with such vividness, that the thing written did not seem to his readers
the thing actually done. 9
11. Timothy Smith, Miller is A Man Who Stands by His Taunts, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1995, at B 11.
12. Words of One Syllable, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 1981, at 212.
13, R.H. PATTERSON, ECONOMY OF CAPITAL, in WILLIAM B. HODGSON, ERRORS IN THE USE OF
ENGLISH 219 (1885).
14, Vincent Canby, "El Norte": A Fine Movie Fueled by Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1984, at
17 (characterizing the naive belief of two young Guatemalan immigrants about the riches of America).
15. Opening lines of Kenny Rogers' popular song, Through the Years (Liberty Records 1982).
16. JAMES A. FROUDE, THE NEMESIS OF FAITH 8 (1849), cited in HODGSON, supra note 13, at 218.
17, Letter of recommendation for applicant to Yale Graduate School (on file with the author).
18, OrTO JESPERSEN, NEGATION IN ENGLISH AND OTHER LANGUAGES, in SELECTED WRITINGS
75 (1962) (emphasis added).
19. JOHN FORSTER, 2 LIFE OF CHARLES DICKENS 181 (1873), cited in HODGSON, supra note 13,
at 219,
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Indeed, as Hodgson observed a century ago, "Piled-up negatives prove
easy stumbling-blocks."2 But these stumbling-blocks have been known
to imbalance the scales of justice as well as ensnaring literary lions. Bryant
cites an Alabama state court case from 1912 in which Aletha Allen, an 80-
year-old deaf woman, was killed by a train after having been warned not
to go onto the track, prompting her estate to sue the Central of Georgia
Railway Company.21 The original verdict was for the defendant, the jury
finding the late Ms. Allen guilty of contributory negligence, but a new trial
was granted because of an errant Triplex Negatio:
The charge to the jury had been that unless the jurors believed from the
evidence that the engineer did not discover the peril of the woman in time to
avoid injury, they must decide in favor of the defendant. The higher court
held that unless meant "if not," the use of the double negative having the
effect of making the charge predicate the defendant's right to an acquaintance
based upon the fact that its engineer did see the dangerous position of Aletha
Allen in time to prevent the injury. The jury overlooked the grammatical
inaccuracy, as the court did, and interpreted the charge as a correct
proposition of the law. Thus the court ordered that the original verdict be
adhered to.
The decision was based on the interpretation of the intent. The court did
not intend to use a double negative; the jury not realizing that a double
negative was used, gave their verdict accordingly.2
Thus the principle that Triplex Negatio Confundit is enshrined in the halls
of justice, at least in Alabama, and semantic content is once again
overruled by pragmatic intent.
Finally, a word or two on minding one's Q's and R's, as an elucidation
of Jerry Sadock's remarks.' Following Grice, I take the maxim of Quality
as supervenient in the sense that other maxims come into operation only on
the assumption that Quality-or what Lewis has termed a convention of
20. HODGSON, supra note 13, at 219.
21. MARGARET M. BRYANT, ENGLISH IN THE LAw CoURTs 264 (1930) (citing Central of Georgia
Ry. Co. v. Finch, 59 So. 619 (Ala. 1912)).
22. Id. Unless remains a problem, even when no legal precedents are involved, as demonstrated
by the head of the now St. Louis Rams football team in his complaint about the (un)faimess of his
fellow owners: "John Shaw, the Rams' president, was unhappy over the developments. 'We expect nil
teams to be treated the same,' Shaw said. 'Unless we find out that teams are not treated equally, then
we'll take action."' (Timothy Smith, Fate of Raiders' Move Now Rests With League, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1995, at 29.)
23. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 1, at 951.
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truthfulness-is satisfied.24 Setting Quality aside, I have argued that the
other maxims can be regimented into two basic functional principles.25
The Q Principle (evoking Quantity) is a lower-bounded hearer-based
guarantee of the sufficiency of informative content ("Say as much as you
can, modulo quality and R"); it collects the first Quantity maxim ("Make
your contribution as informative as is required. . ."), along with the first
two submaxims of Manner ("Avoid obscurity" and "Avoid ambiguity").
The R Principle (evoking Relation) is an upper-bounded speaker-based
correlate of the Principle of Least Effort, dictating minimization of form
("Say no more than you must, modulo Y"); it collects the second Quantity
maxim ("Make your contribution no more informative than is required")
along with Relation and the second two Manner submaxims ("Be orderly"
and "Avoid unnecessary [sic] prolixity"). Q-based implicature is typically
negative in the sense that its calculation refers crucially to what the speaker
could have said but didn't: H infers from S's failure to use a more
informative and/or briefer form that S was not in a position to do so. Its
locus classicus is scalar implicature: I infer from your saying that some of
your friends are felons that (for all you know) not all of them are. R-based
implicature typically involves social rather than purely linguistic motivation
and is best exemplified by indirect speech acts and in particular euphe-
mism: S counts on H's recognizing a stronger meaning S must have
intended (without expressing that meaning directly) by virtue of H's
knowledge of the social conventions leading S to avoid expressing that
stronger meaning more explicitly.
The two principles are in constant potential conflict: If I tell you that I
broke a finger yesterday, you will R-infer that it was one of my fingers I
broke, unless the common ground entails or accommodates the proposition
that I'm an enforcer for the mob, in which case you will Q-infer that it
wasn't one of mine. The two opposed principles also determine a variety
of patterns influencing lexical choice and lexical change.
Relevant to our purposes here, both Q- and R- based implicature play
major roles in the way laws are interpreted and enforced, a point made by
Jeff Kaplan in an unpublished but instructive paper on the topic.26 Let me
24, DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY (1969).
25. See Laurence R. Horn, Toward a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Reference, in MEANING,
FoRM, AND USE IN CONTEXT (Deborah Schiffrin ed., 1984); LAURENCE R. HORN, A NATURAL HISTORY
OF NEGATION (1989); Horn, supra note 10.
26. Jeffrey Kaplan, Out-of-Court Speech vs. Legislation: Does Quantity Apply (1992) (unpublished
paper presented at the annual meeting of the Linguistic Society of America).
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here point to two kinds of interpretations that illustrate the point. Q-based
reasoning from what was not said is often explicitly recognized in statutory
interpretation:
In an amendment to the Public Health Service Act, Congress in 1981 said
that clinics receiving Federal funds for contraceptive services should, "to the
extent practical," encourage family participation in their activities. If Congress
had wanted to require parental notification, Judge Edwards said, it could have
used more explicit language."
In some cases, this style of reasoning is implicitly recognized by a clause
that suspends it in a particular context:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
so as to deny or disparage others retained by the people.28
But R-based reasoning plays its role as well. If, as noted, a statute
criminalizing "the detestable act against nature" can be held to apply
constitutionally against sodomy (itself a term with a tangled legal and
moral history) and not, say, against the felling of a tree, we are in the realm
of R. The framers of the law were not imprecise because they did not know
which detestable act against nature they wanted to penalize, but because
they would prefer to avoid direct mention and counted on the enforcers of
the law to pick out the appropriate culprits.
Once again, it is only the unauthorized acts against nature that fall within
the scope of the ordinance. In expanding the domain of the scienter
requirement or in restricting the domain of an ordinance applying to driving
vehicles or to engaging in more private activities, the standard interpretation
of statutory law will inevitably force upon some words meanings they will
not bear, while excluding from others meanings they bear. To be a law-
abiding citizen in this world, it helps to be a mind-reader.
27. Robert Pear, Administration Presses Court on Teen-Age Contraceptive Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May
10, 1983, at A21 (discussing a restraining order barring enforcement of a Utah state law requiring
parental notification for sale of contraceptives to minors).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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